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Abstract
As smartphone usage continues to grow, one of the most important unresolved issues
is protecting the privacy of data, both stored by and generated from mobile devices.
Various attempts at protection have been proposed, however, how to meet both the
privacy and usability requirements well is still an open problem. This thesis presents a
solution which provides privacy while minimizing the impact on usability. By providing
fake information to unwanted but unavoidable requests for sensitive data or sensor
readings, we allow applications to execute unhindered. Meanwhile, in doing so we also
protect the user’s privacy and offer a graceful degradation of service when mock data
is given to the requester. We implement our design to work within existing and novel
permission frameworks for the Android OS, and measure performance and usability
impacts.
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1 Introduction
Data privacy has become a major issue for users of mobile devices which allow interested
parties like advertisement companies access to highly personal information. From location
accurate within meters to the names, phone numbers, birthdays and more of personal
contacts, there is an unprecedented amount of data about users available. To combat this,
we provide users with a method of giving applications they do not trust fake, or “mock”
data. This allows applications which expect their requests for data to be fulfilled by valid
data to function correctly while protecting the user’s real data from being accessed. This
is useful because many applications will request data that is not central to the purpose
of said application. Users find these applications useful, but would prefer not to give the
application carte blanche access to their data. The Android Operating System (OS) allows
users to review what data and services an application has access to before they install the
application. However, the user must either allow the application full access to the data it
requests, or abort the installation process. This all-or-nothing approach makes it impossible
for users to allow partial access to applications. This is where Metis steps in, providing an
intuitive, lightweight approach that bridges the gap between privacy and usability.
For example, users may want to install an Internet radio application which will tell
them what their friends who also use this application are listening to. When installing this
application, the users must allow the application access to their Facebook friends as well
as their location. The users face a dilemma because while they want the application to be
able to access their friend lists, they do not trust the application with their location data.
Without Metis, this is an impossible goal to achieve. With Metis, the users can specify that
their location should not be shared with untrusted applications, and install the Internet
radio application. When the radio application goes to access the user’s Facebook friends,
it receives the user’s real friend list. However, when the application tries to access the
user’s location to better target advertisements, it will receive a mock location, thereby not
disclosing the user’s real location and allowing the application to function as intended.
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1.1 Background
Usage of smartphones has grown exponentially in recent years, and has already surpassed
traditional desktop/laptop usage in some areas [16]. As specific mobile ecosystems (Android,
iOS, Windows Phone, etc.) mature, users are doing an increasing proportion of their work
on mobile devices. By moving to a more mobile-centric workflow, users are storing their data
in more widely accessible places including on their mobile devices and on widely available
servers or groups of servers (“the cloud”). These locations offer greater flexibility than
more traditional locations, but with this flexibility comes an increased risk of data misuse
or theft.
Misuse can occur when users’ data is sold to partners of the storing company or used
to target advertisements. Often this occurs without the user’s explicit consent by requiring
the user to agree to lengthy and verbose terms of service. Even when users read the terms
of service, they are often confused by the legal wording and structure of such documents [1].
Furthermore, companies frequently change their terms of service without giving any noti-
fication to their existing users. Therefore, users are largely ignorant of how their data is
handled and secured, leading to rampant misuse and overexposure of user data.
Data theft is equally troubling, as even if a company acts in good faith with regard to
user data it can still be leaked to third parties. Many large online services have had their
users’ data stolen via simple misconfigurations in their storage infrastructure [23, 25] or
compromised employee accounts [13,17]. Despite rather large and repeated incidents [13,23],
users continue to use online services to store their data. Alternative companies [3] exist
which provide much stronger guarantees of privacy and security and have perfect track
records, yet are less popular. Clearly, users value usability among other traits more than
they do privacy. However, users do value privacy, particularly when it comes to dealing
with advertisers. In fact, users will opt for less usability to stop what they perceive as
unauthorized data collection [2].
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1.2 Motivation
As the previous section explains, data privacy is clearly a fundamental issue to many users of
mobile devices. However, users are not willing to sacrifice usability to protect their data in
most cases. In some ways, users view privacy and usability as mutually exclusive properties.
While every user has different reasons, the question of why user data should be con-
sidered private in the first place is important to examine. User data has clear value to
companies [18], which sets a baseline by which its value may be judged. Further, United
States Law provides legal protection of data users do not explicitly consent to transmit to
the party who ends up using their data [4]. When user privacy is broken by a company,
the potential monetary damages are severe [14]. There is ample evidence to support a user
who expects its data to be private until explicitly given to a third party.
Given that data privacy is important, the need for measures which provide data privacy
to be usable seems clear. Without usable means of protecting data privacy, users will forgo
such protections in favor of less secure, more fluid options. This can be seen as a failure of
technology to provide a viable solution to a reasonable need. In the next section, a survey
of the current work in this field shows that no current system successfully fills both roles of
protecting user data and being usable for the end user.
1.3 Outline
Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 describes the design of Metis, including an
architecture overview. Section 4 covers the details of our implementation and description
of the additions to the Android framework. Section 5 presents an evaluation of both the
performance and usability of our solution. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The subject of data privacy has been a hot area of research recently. Others have looked
at tracking data flows, expanding and augmenting permission-based systems, separating
advertising from applications, and anonymizing user data for use by advertisers. As Wei
et al. [27] demonstrated, the permission landscape in Android has grown over time, mostly
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due to the addition of new kinds of hardware to smartphones. They also show that many
applications are “over-privileged”, meaning that they request more permissions than they
need to function correctly. In a similar study, Felt et al. [8] programmatically detect over-
privileged applications by analyzing which API calls the applications use, and mapping
these to the permissions they require to function. They find that more than 33% of all
applications are over-privileged.
2.1 Fine-Grained Authentication
This points to the need for some way to control applications that does not rely on the
developer. The major attempts at such a system generally try to make authentication
more fine-grained or to provide a mechanism for keeping private data private. Fine-grained
authentication approaches attempt to increase the usability and adoption of authentication.
In doing so, they help protect users from the potential for applications to misuse their
data. There have been multiple attempts [7, 15, 19] at utilizing the sensors available on
smartphones to determine if the owner of the phone is the one attempting to use it, and
whether or not to require they authenticate themselves. Riva et al. [19] utilize location
among other signals to detect if authentication is even necessary before the user can complete
an action such as reading an email. Seifert et al. [15] develop a model of spheres wherein
some applications can only be used when the phone is in a more secure sphere, such as at
the owner’s house or office. Researchers at Microsoft have explored [7] how users share their
mobile devices, and experimented [9] with a guest mode where only applications without
access to sensitive information can be used to facilitate device usage by multiple, untrusted
guests.
Metis uses a similar approach as these efforts, but applies it to the Android permission
model instead of authentication outright. By allowing fine-grained control over permissions,
we keep authentication simple and predictable, and make the user interaction with our
system a one-time configuration. With fine-grained authentication users may not be able to
anticipate when their phones will require them to authenticate, leading to frustration when
authentication is required at an inopportune moment.
8
2.2 Data Privacy
Instead of managing access to the device and applications, many have attempted to simply
secure important data so that it cannot be misused by applications, malicious or other-
wise. One of the earliest and most well-known attempts at controlling the data directly is
TaintDroid [26]. TaintDroid is a system to monitor the flow of sensitive data throughout
the Android system, and alert the user to data leakage. While being well designed and
only modestly impacting performance, TaintDroid requires too much from the end user to
be considered usable by a non-technical smartphone user. Metis takes a simpler approach,
which increases usability at the expense of not having the insight into the flow of sensitive
data like TaintDroid.
Pearce et al. [22] found that over 34% of applications request location data purely for a
bundled advertising library. With such a high number of applications utilizing potentially
invasive ads, many researchers have studied systems which would decouple application code
from advertising code. AdSplit [24] complete separates the two, placing advertising libraries
in their own sandbox. This allows them to work with the permission system to grant the
application and advertisements permissions separately. AdDroid [22] provides an API and
new permissions for advertisers built into the Android platform. In a slightly different vein,
Leontiadis et al. [12] also separate the advertising networks from applications. However,
being sensitive to the revenue model of in-application adverts, they allow for a variable
amount of data to be sent to advertisers based on how frequently the user engages with the
adverts. Tackling the issue at a different level, Haddadi et al. [11] propose a system which
allows for anonymous data to be collected directly by the advertisers.
There have been other attempts at providing alternate data to applications. Hornyack
et al. [21] provide “shadow” data, which is simply fake or empty data to applications which
request access to it. They also allow for data to be marked as local-only data, meaning
that any attempt to transfer this data over a network is blocked, using TaintDroid to
detect such an attempt. These policies are applied to all applications on the device. In
contrast, Metis provides a similar form of data masking, but does so only to applications
which have been considered untrusted. This allows for critical applications like messaging or
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direction applications to function correctly while still protecting user data from non-critical
applications like games. In additioin, Metis allows for third-party providers to generate the
mock data needed for untrusted applications. This is more modular than the approach of
hard coding values into the OS and associated framework, and it can easily allow for realistic
looking data in the event when application developers begin to verify the authenticity of
the data they receive. Finally, while the idea of local-only data is helpful in protecting data
privacy, it is not a guarantee that the data cannot be exfiltrated. A determined application
can copy the data in ways which TaintDroid cannot detect or track, and then continue with
exfiltration. Since Metis does not attempt to provide a comparable service, it does not
suffer from the same issue.
Another effort to provide fake data to applications is shown by Zhou et al. [28]. Unlike
the previous system, this one is highly configurable. The user may, for every application,
view the permissions that the application was granted at install time. For each permission,
the user can then select one of four modes: trusted, anonymous, bogus, or empty. The
anonymous mode attempts to provide useful but unidentifiable data whereas the bogus
mode simply returns some valid data. The other two modes function as expected, with
trusted providing the real data and empty returning nothing. While this design provides
a higher level of flexibility than Metis, setting modes for individual permissions on every
application is unwieldy. Users are both ignorant of how to configure systems securely and
unwilling to spend long periods of time to do so. Also, users generally are either fine with
giving an application their data, or they are not. This binary preference lends itself to a
binary model as opposed to the four state model used by these researchers.
2.3 Android Mock Package
Android contains a set of mock classes [6] intended for testing applications which rely
on non-trivial amounts of real data such as a populated database or dynamically loaded
resources. These classes can be extended by an application to mimic the function of a
component without requiring that the mocked component actually be fully functioning or
have useful data. While there is a superficial similarity between this form of mocking
and ours, the intended use cases are very different. Android’s test.mock package is to
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be used for testing purposes while our mocking is intended to protect the privacy of user
data. The provided classes are private components of applications, and cannot normally
be accessed by other apps on the same device. Even if they are opened for public use,
they cannot force other applications to use them instead of the associated real providers.
Our approach transparently routes all desired requests to a mock provided regardless of
application preference.
2.3.1 Mock Location
Outside of the mock classes provided in the test.mock package, Android has a built-in
capacity for mock locations [20]. This allows any application with permission to respond to
location requests as if it were a real provider. While this is closer to our approach, there are
several problems making this not a robust solution. Firstly, the mock location is reported as
GPS coordinates. This means that an application could ignore updates from any provider
with the GPS type, and still get real location information. Even worse, an application could
easily detect the use of a mock location by checking both GPS updates and a more coarse
location provider like the network or Wi-Fi, and note the discrepancies. In contrast, our
approach is consistent across any location provider, and cannot be evaded as it intercepts
all location requests.
3 Solution Design
We now introduce Metis, our solution to the data privacy problems inherent in the Android
OS. Metis provides effective data privacy while minimizing the effect on application usability.
It ensures data privacy by flagging configurable portions of user data (with reasonable
defaults) as private. When an application is installed, the user classifies it as trusted or
untrusted. Trusted applications are allowed full access to any data for which they request
permission. Untrusted applications are not allowed to access private data, instead being
given “mock” data when they request private information. This substitution is completely
transparent to the application, which allows for the application to continue to function while
maintaining data privacy for the user. Metis achieves this goal through a combination of
11
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Applications
Figure 1: Metis architecture diagram
app classification, request routing, and mock providers.
3.1 Architecture
Metis is built around three loosely coupled modules, as shown in Figure 1. The user interacts
with a UI to classify applications, which are stored to a persistent datastore. As applications
send requests for user data, the router intercepts them, and checks with the datastore if the
requesting application has permission to access the requested data. If so, the router passes
the request on to the real provider. If not, the request is sent to the corresponding mock
provider. Regardless of which provider handles the request, the data is then returned to
the application.
3.1.1 App Classification
One of the key features of Metis is its simplicity of use. At install time, Metis will check
the application’s permissions against a list of permissions which are considered dangerous
enough to leak private data. This list can be modified by the user, but is shipped with a
reasonable default set of dangerous permissions. If the application being installed requests
one or more of the dangerous permissions, the user will be asked if the application is
trusted or untrusted. Trusted applications are allowed full access to any data they request
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permission for whereas untrusted applications are restricted from data which requires a
dangerous permission to access. The classifier stores the application’s package name in a
persistent datastore, along with whether it is trusted or not. This list of which applications
are trusted can also be edited after install time if the user changes its mind.
Since the major purpose of the app classifier is to present the user with an intuitive
interface, there is little actual complexity involved in writing such a classifier. While the
classifier must be trusted by the user to be non-malicious, the runtime needs no special
permissions beyond the ability to communicate with the datastore. Therefore, the classifier
can sit in user-space. In order to ensure the integrity of the classifier, implementations
may use tools specific to the implementation target platform. We utilize one such property
within the Android framework, and discuss this more in Section 4.
3.1.2 Request Routing
When an application requests user data outside of its own control, the request is first passed
to the router. The router checks if the permission associated with the request is considered
dangerous. If not, the request is forwarded to its normal destination unmodified. Similarly,
if the application making the request is trusted, the request is also forwarded. In the case
that both the request is considered dangerous and the application is untrusted, the router
modifies the request, instead sending it to the associated mock provider, which will return
the mock data. All of this data is stored in the datastore, including which mock providers
can service which kinds of data requests.
Intercepting requests for data needs to be performant as such requests are very common
in most applications. In order to provide such performance along with a router that cannot
be bypassed by malicious applications, the router is run as a privileged service. It is designed
such that modifications to the router itself should not be needed for either changes to the
user interface or changes to how the mock data is generated and returned.
3.1.3 Mock Providers
To provide the aforementioned mock data when it is requested, mock providers take a
certain kind of request and return mock data conforming to the type of data expected by
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the requesting application. This is the most flexible portion of Metis, and is meant to
be easy to override with third-party providers. Currently, application developers do not
check [28] if the data they are requesting appears to be valid. Thus, the mock providers
currently in use are simplistic in nature, returning static or otherwise easily generated data.
In the future, if the need arose for more realistic data to be returned, a new mock provider
could be written and distributed to anyone using Metis without the need for any internal
changes to the Metis system itself.
Coupled with the idea that mock providers should be modular, they must also be trusted.
However, beyond this they do not require any special permissions, as they communicate only
with the request router. As with the classifier above, we will discuss the specific feature of
Android that satisfies the trusted aspect of mock providers in the next section. In systems
where this or a comparable feature is not present, Metis would simply rely on the user to
verify third-party mock providers. Other modifications are possible, but are outside of the
scope of this thesis.
4 Implementation
Metis is implemented as part of the Android framework, as well as standard applications.
The app classifier and mock providers are implemented as standard applications while the
request routing is implemented as part of the Android framework itself. This approach
was taken in order to make the user interface and mock providers easy to upgrade. This
decision also allows us to introduce as little code as possible to the Android framework itself.
By reducing the amount of code that runs with system privileges, the possible number of
programming bugs and potential security holes is reduced.
4.1 Android Applications
Both the app classifier and the various mock providers are implemented as Android ap-
plications. We discuss each one in detail, but first examine the trust model which they
both share. As mentioned in Section 3, both application components must be trusted by
the user and the system. If either was not trusted, there is no way to guarantee that the
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user’s data is actually being protected. For example, if the user replaced the app classifier
with untrusted code, there would be no way to verify that the untrusted classifier actually
marked applications the user specified as untrusted. This classifier could easily mark every
application, regardless of user preference, as trusted. Similarly, if a mock provider was
untrusted, it could simply return the user’s actual data in place of the mock data it should
return.
To ensure that these scenarios are not possible, Metis registers two new permissions
with Android, SET METIS PREFRENCES and PROVIDE MOCK DATA. Both permissions are given
the signatureOrSystem protection level. This allows only system-level applications like
the request router or applications which are signed with the same developer certificate as
the defining application to request and be granted these permissions [5]. Therefore, only
verified and system applications will be able to request these permissions, which are required
to interact with Metis.
Specifically, SET METIS PREFRENCES is required by the app classifier to update the data-
store with what permissions are considered dangerous and what applications are untrusted.
It is worth noting that even querying the Metis datastore for which permissions and ap-
plications are currently considered dangerous and untrusted requires this permission. Such
security is required to make sure that other applications cannot detect when a user has
elected to give them mock data. In the same vein, PROVIDE MOCK DATA is required by any
mock provider, and is required to both receive requests from the router and to return replies
to those requests. Again, this is to prevent applications from listening for requests for mock
data and inferring if the data they request is real or mocked.
4.1.1 App Classifier
The app classifier is responsible for managing and displaying the user interface along with
setting and displaying the current state of the Metis datastore. The classifier listens for a
broadcast from the Android system in which a new application has been installed, and then
launches a modal dialog, asking if the newly installed application is trusted or untrusted.
By presenting the user with the classification task during the install procedure, the user
should be primed to reason about the newly installed application. Also, by using a modal,
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we visually convey that this question is part of the installation procedure. For non-technical
users, or those users who find the default privacy settings adequate, this will be the only
interaction they have with Metis.
If the user is interested in changing the trustworthiness of an application or changing
which permissions are considered dangerous, the app classifier can be launched like any
other Android application. Since it is the only user-facing portion of Metis, the application
itself is titled Metis. Upon launching, the application displays a simple menu, allowing
users to manage their applications, or manage their privacy policy. Both items function
similarly, displaying a list of trusted applications and dangerous permissions, respectively.
We chose to display these lists, as opposed to their complements, because we expect that
most applications will be considered untrusted by users, and most permissions are not
dangerous. At the end of the list, an add button allows the user to add any of the currently
untrusted applications or non-dangerous permissions to the trusted application or dangerous
permission list. Users are also able to remove the current items from these lists. All
preference changes are sent to the datastore in a background thread.
4.2 Android Framework Modifications
The request router is implemented by directly modifying the Android framework. In order
to guarantee that every request for user data would be captured by the router, system-
level modifications are the only choice. If a user-level application were used, applications
which used direct communication with the intended data provider would be impossible to
intercept. However, running as part of the Android framework does provide the router with
better performance than otherwise possible. This speedup is mainly due to eliminating a
context switch per message sent or received.
To support the design of a centralized router, we modified many of the existing An-
droid classes related to content. Where requests for data could possibly end up, we
added a hook which calls the checkAccess method of the router. In many places like
the LocationManager and TelephonyManager, these hooks are simple additions. For other
resources that do not pass through a high-level manager class like the Camera, we instru-
mented the open calls instead. When a request is sent to one of these original recipients,
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it is then forwarded along with where it came from. The router uses this information to
determine which permission the requesting application needed to be allowed to make this
request. It then checks the Metis datastore to determine if this permission is considered
dangerous. If it is not, the router will simply get the requested data and return it to the
original recipient. If the permission is dangerous, another check is made to determine if
the requesting application is trusted. Like before, if it is a trusted application, the router
completes the request normally. However, in the case of an untrusted application making
a request, the router will send the request to the mock provider registered to handle the
specific kind of request being made.
4.2.1 Datastore
Besides its main duty of routing data requests, the router also handles access to the data-
store. When users updates their preferences or a new mock provider is installed, the asso-
ciated applications will send a request to modify some data in the datastore. The router
checks for the proper permissions as discussed earlier, and then makes the actual changes.
Since we do not store any structured data beyond a set, the datastore is implemented using
Android’s SharedPreferences. This allows for efficient random access which is well suited
for the periodic lookups that routing requests generate.
4.3 Mock Data
To demonstrate Metis at work, we supply three mock providers which work with untrusted
applications to provide mock locations, device ID’s, and user contacts. While each of these
mock providers is relatively simplistic, they can be replaced with more realistic providers
if there is a need. Furthermore, mock providers for other kinds of data can easily be
incorporated. Every mock provider registers at install time with Metis. During registration,
the mock provider tells Metis what kind of requests it can handle, which is then saved to
the datastore. If a new mock provider attempts to register for a request type that is already
bound to another mock provider, the old binding is overwritten with the new mock provider.
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4.3.1 Location
The location mock provider is a simple mock provider which registers for location data via
the ACCESS FINE LOCATION and ACCESS COARSE LOCATION permissions. When called, the
mock provider will generate a random latitude and longitude roughly bounded to be within
the continental United States. This initial location will be saved for a random duration
between 30 minutes and 24 hours. If subsequent calls are made, a small random delta
will be added to the initial location, which will then be updated with this new location.
When the time from initial location generation is elapsed, all current location data will be
cleared, and the next call to the mock provider will act as though it is the first call. This
implementation generates mildly realistic location data which is completely different from
a user’s actual location.
4.3.2 Unique Device Identifier
Providing a mock identifier is very simple, and requires little code. This mock provider
registers for requests against the device identifier via the permission READ PHONE STATE. We
simply apply the SHA-1 hash function to the full package name of the requesting application.
This allows for multiple calls from the same application to return a consistent value while
thwarting cross-application tracking which using the device identifier as an invariant. This
method is extremely simple, and does cause any two phones using Metis to report the same
device identifier to the same applications. For now, this is of little concern as no known
applications attempt to verify such information. If this approach were to become less useful,
a simple update to the mock provider with a more sophisticated algorithm would solve the
problem, and demonstrate the strength of the Metis model.
4.3.3 Contacts
The contacts mock provider is more involved than the previous two described due to the
way Android represents a contact. It registers for all requests dealing with contacts, via the
READ CONTACTS and WRITE CONTACTS permissions. When called, our mock provider returns
a static list of three mock contacts. Any attempts to add to or edit these contacts are
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allowed, but never persisted. This gives the illusion of being able to dynamically modify a
user’s contacts, but all attempts are simply discarded.
5 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of Metis, we wanted to ensure that Metis had acceptable per-
formance to be usable and to explore how running Metis impacted many of the most popular
free applications from the Google Play store [10]. All testing was done using a modified
version of the Android 4.1.2 r1 “Jelly Bean” release.
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Figure 2: Average runtime for micro-benchmarks (n = 10)
5.1 Performance
To measure the performance of Metis, we created three micro-benchmarks which exercised
our three mock providers by requesting the data they provided. We ran these benchmarks
10 times each on a stock Android system and on a system with Metis installed. On the Metis
system we marked our application as both trusted and untrusted, and ran the benchmarks
under both configurations. We also changed the permissions that our mock providers service
to not dangerous, but the results were indistinguishable from the trusted application runs
and thus omitted.
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As Figure 2 shows, Metis introduces a modest overhead when retrieving both the location
and device identifiers. We can attribute some of this overhead to the hook Metis makes
into the location and telephony managers as discussed in the previous section. When
an application is untrusted, we see an increase in overhead again due to the extra time
required to call out to the mock providers. In the location benchmark, the increase from
trusted to untrusted is minimal, since the mock provider itself executes just as quickly if not
quicker than actually querying a real location sensor like the GPS. In the device identifier
benchmark, the extra overhead is much more noticeable, because the real provider of the
device identifier is a simple access whereas the mock provider computes a hash for every
request. Unlike the other two, the contacts benchmark is quicker when tested with an
untrusted application than when tested with a trusted one. This is most likely because of
the static nature of our contacts mock provider.
Overall, we see that Metis incurs only a modest overhead in most scenarios. It is a bit
concerning that performance is so closely tied to the relative efficiency of the mock provider
when compared to the real provider. However, since all mock providers must be verified
anyway, performance can be tuned to within an acceptable threshold before a new mock
provider is accepted.
5.2 Usability
To ensure that Metis was not only performant, but did not interfere with the users’ ability
to use their applications, we downloaded the top 25 free applications from the Google Play
store. Free applications are much more likely to be untrusted, since most users won’t pay
for applications they do not trust. Also, the prevalence of advertising libraries is much
greater in free applications.
We ran two tests, the first with all applications set as untrusted and the permissions
associated with location, device identifiers, and contacts considered dangerous. We then
attempted to use the applications, and noted any usability issues. After this, we marked
the permission allowing an application to utilize our coarse location as not dangerous, and
made any application whose main purpose directly related to one of the aforementioned
permissions as trusted. For example, if users downloaded the Skype application, presumably
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Figure 3: Application Usability Under Metis
they want to talk to some of their contacts via Skype. Trying to achieve this with mock
contact data will fail for obvious reasons.
5.2.1 App Usability with Mock Data
We classified how the applications were affected by the mock data into one of five cate-
gories. Applications which failed to function when used with mock data were placed in
the “Crashed” category. Applications which had their major feature or functionality im-
peded had “Major Issues”. If a relatively minor, but still desired feature was impeded the
application was placed into the “Undesired Issues” category. For some applications, Metis
blocked a portion of the application which was not a directly listed feature or related to
the advertisements. Those were placed in the “Desired Issues” category, and applications
which Metis had no noticeable impact on were classified under the “No Effect” category.
From the results in Figure 3, we can see that even in the strictest setting, 44% of
untrusted applications function correctly. Most of those that do not are applications like
Skype in the example above. Once we correct for this, over 75% of applications function
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properly, with only 4% of applications being unusable. These numbers show that Metis
is extremely usable, even for security conscious users. More importantly, we observe that
Metis fulfills its purpose of protecting user data privacy well, blocking advertiser’s access
to private data as intended.
6 Conclusion
It is a challenging task to protect user data privacy while minimizing the degradation in
usability in smartphones. In this thesis, we proposed a solution called Metis to tackle this
problem.
Metis is a system of loosely-coupled components for protecting a user’s data privacy
from unwanted access. It accomplishes this goal by supplying mock data to untrusted
applications which request private data. We implemented Metis as part of the Android
framework and standard applications. Then, we evaluated the performance of Metis and its
usability. Our experimental results show that Metis is able to effectively protect user data
privacy without degrading the usability, and the performance overhead incurred by Metis
is modest.
6.1 Future Work
There are many avenues for further study and work relating to the Metis model for data
privacy. While the user interface presented by the app classifier is clean and intuitive,
more direct study on improving it could be beneficial. Usability is a key feature of Metis
which can always be improved. In this vein, automatically classifying applications could
help non-technical users have a more usable experience while not sacrificing data privacy.
The automatic classification could be based on voluntary feedback from other Metis users
as to how they have classified applications on their mobile systems. A central server could
aggregate this data, and then make suggestions for new users based on the most popular
trends.
Barring a vulnerability in the Android framework, Metis should not suffer from security
issues directly. However, side-channel leaks such as a timing attack could allow an applica-
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tion to detect when the data returned to them is from a mock provider. It would be best if
the request router were able to make sure that requests sent to real and mock providers take
a roughly equal amount of time. There is an inherent performance trade-off for this kind
of protection, but further study into the value of such a trade-off is warranted. It would
also be preferable to ship Metis with a more complete set of mock providers as well as more
realistic ones. However, this is a minor issue due to the modularity of mock providers.
Performance can always be improved as well. Metis currently follows a conceptually
simple model, but this leads to some inefficiencies in the implementation. There are hooks
placed into some of the Android system code which could probably be optimized by doing
the necessary checks and calls to the data providers at the source, instead of using the
router as a proxy. Cutting down on inter-process communication like this would reduce the
latency shown in Figure 2.
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